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Abstract
We present a DSGE model with agency costs, where heterogeneous ﬁrms choose among two
alternative instruments of external ﬁnance - corporate bonds and bank loans. We charac-
terize the ﬁnancing choice of ﬁrms and the endogenous ﬁnancial structure of the economy.
The calibrated model is used to address questions such as: What explains diﬀerences in the
ﬁnancial structure of the US and the euro area? What are the implications of these diﬀer-
ences for allocations? We ﬁnd that a higher share of bank ﬁnance in the euro area relative
to the US is due to lower availability of public information about ﬁrms’ credit worthiness
and to higher eﬃciency of banks in acquiring this information. We also quantify the eﬀect
of diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure on per-capita GDP.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper looks at the ﬁnancial structure, i.e. the composition of the corporate sector’s
external ﬁnance, as an important dimension through which credit market imperfections aﬀect
the macroeconomy. In the presence of agency costs, the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries is to
provide contractual arrangements that reduce the eﬀects of information asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers. This is achieved by oﬀering alternative ﬁnancing instruments that best
ﬁt the needs of individual borrowers. Each instrument diﬀers in the cost imposed to lenders
and borrowers and in the ability to reduce the eﬀects of information asymmetries. Hence, the
choice of entrepreneurs among alternative instruments of external ﬁnance might have important
implications for the macroeconomic eﬀects of credit market frictions.
We introduce heterogeneous ﬁrms and alternative instruments of external ﬁnance in an
otherwise standard DSGE model with agency costs. We characterize the optimal choice of
each ﬁrm among alternative instruments and we derive the endogenous ﬁnancial structure of
the economy. The model can then be used as a laboratory to answer questions such as: What
are the causes of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures among countries? What are the implications
of these diﬀerences for allocations?
Evidence on the ﬁnancial structure across countries suggest that these questions are rele-
vant. For instance, the traditional distinction between bank-based and market-based countries
applies to the euro area and the US. Investment of the corporate sector appears to rely much
more heavily on bank ﬁnance in the euro area than in the US. In 2001, bank loans to the
corporate sector amounted to 42.6 percent of GDP in the euro area, and to 18.8 percent in
the US. Conversely, outstanding debt securities of non-ﬁnancial corporations and stock market
capitalization amounted respectively to 6.5 and 71.7 in the euro area, and to 28.9 and 137.1
percent in the US.1 Other, although less striking, diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure of the
US and of the euro area occur in the debt to equity ratio of the corporate sector, and in the
average risk premium and default rate on bank loans.
Existing DSGE models with agency costs do not allow to explain observed diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial structures, as these models do not distinguish between alternative instruments of
external ﬁnance. In this paper, we introduce two types of ﬁnancial intermediaries - commercial
banks and capital mutual funds - into a DSGE model with agency costs. Each type of ﬁnancial
1Source: Ehrmann et al (2003), Table 14.1.
2intermediary oﬀers a diﬀerent intra-period contractual arrangement to provide external ﬁnance
to ﬁrms. Firms experience a sequence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the ﬁrst being
realized before ﬁrms take ﬁnancing decisions. Therefore, when choosing the instrument of
external ﬁnance ﬁrms are heterogeneous in the risk they face of defaulting at the end of the
period. Banks and capital mutual funds (CMFs) diﬀer because banks are willing to spend
resources to acquire information about ﬁrms in distress, while CMFs are not. Conditional
on the information obtained, banks give ﬁrms the option to obtain loans and produce or to
abstain from production and keep the initial net worth (except for a fee to be paid to banks as
compensation for the costs of information acquisition). The fact that banks spend resources to
obtain information implies that bonds are less costly than bank loans. Nonetheless, ﬁnancing
through bonds is a risky choice for ﬁrms, because a situation of ﬁnancial distress can only be
resolved with liquidation and with the complete loss of the ﬁrm’s initial net worth.
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o no ft h ep a p e ri st w o f o l d . F i r s t ,w es h o wt h a tﬁrms heterogeneity can
easily be embedded in a DSGE model without giving up tractability. The dynamics of the
economy can be described by a system of aggregate equilibrium conditions similar to those
arising in models with no ex-ante heterogeneity. Second, we calibrate the model in steady
state to replicate key diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure among the US and the euro area.
We ﬁnd that a higher share of bank ﬁnance in the euro area relative to the US is due to
lower availability of public information about ﬁrms’ credit worthiness and to higher eﬃciency
of banks in acquiring this information. To assess the quantitative importance of the observed
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures, we compare the ratios of per-capita GDP in the US and
in the euro area generated by models with and without endogenous ﬁnancial structure to the
ratio observed in the data.
Recent business cycle research has emphasized the relevance of agency costs for economic
ﬂuctuations (see for instance Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998,
2000), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004) and Faia
(2002)). In these models, ﬁrms raise external ﬁnance from a single type of intermediaries that
collect funds from dispersed investors. The presence of agency costs aﬀects the macroeconomy
through its eﬀect on net worth. A shock that reduces the level of investment and production
today also leads to a reduction in the amount of net worth that can be used to ﬁnance ﬁrms’
production in the following period. This gives rise to an increase in the desired amount of
3external ﬁnance and to a worsening of the agency costs, thus enhancing the propagation of the
shock.
Our model builds upon the ”output model” presented in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000),
here onwards CF. The main diﬀerence is that in their economy, at the time of stipulating the
ﬁnancial contract, ﬁrms are identical in the risk of default at the end of the period.2 Moreover,
they have access to one type of ﬁnancial intermediaries only. Hence, in their framework it is
not possible to address the importance of the composition of ﬁrms’ external ﬁnance for the
macroeconomy. Another diﬀerence arises in the focus of the analysis. CF address the eﬀect
of agency costs on the transmission of aggregate shocks (ampliﬁcation and persistence). Since
the focus of our paper is on the determinants of ﬁnancial market structures, we restrict our
attention to the steady state of the economy.
Our paper also relates to recent theories of ﬁnancial intermediation (e.g. Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994) and Holstrom and Tirole (1997), among several others). We share with Chem-
manur and Fulghieri (1994) the idea that banks treat diﬀerently borrowing ﬁrms in situations
of ﬁnancial distress because they are long-term players in the debt market while bondholders
are not. Hence, banks have an incentive to acquire a larger amount of information about ﬁrms.
By minimizing the probability of their ineﬃcient liquidation, banks build a reputation for ﬁ-
nancial ﬂexibility and attract ﬁrms that are likely to face temporary situations of distress. The
steady state distribution of ﬁrms arising in our SDGE model closely resembles that obtained by
Holstrom and Tirole (1997) in a two-period model where ﬁrms and intermediaries are capital
constrained. The authors ﬁnd that poorly capitalized ﬁrms do not invest at all. Well capital-
ized ﬁrms ﬁnance their investment directly on the market, relying on cheaper, less-information
intensive ﬁnance. Firms with intermediate levels of capitalization can invest, but only with
the help of information-intensive external ﬁnance.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the sequence of events and outline
the environment. In section 3, we present the analysis. We start by showing that in our
economy the presence of agency costs translates into a ﬁrm-speciﬁc markup that entrepreneurs
2In CF (2000), at the time of the contract ﬁrms can diﬀer in terms of size. However, due to the speciﬁc
characteristic of the contract solution, this type of heterogeneity is not relevant in equilibrium. As ﬁrms are
identical in equilibrium, they can be assumed identical ex-ante. In what follows, we will use the term "ﬁrms’
ex-ante heterogeneity " as implying ﬁrms’ heterogeneity at the time of stipulating the contract in the risk of
defaulting at the end of the period. Contrary to the one considered in CF (2000), this type of heterogeneity
does not disappear in equilibrium.
4need to charge over marginal costs. We proceed to derive the optimal contract between ﬁrms
and ﬁnancial intermediaries, and we characterize the endogenous ﬁnancial structure of the
economy. We show that in each period, conditional on the realization of the ﬁrst idiosyncratic
shock, entrepreneurs split into three sets: entrepreneurs that decide to abstain from production,
entrepreneurs that approach a bank and possibly obtain a loan, and entrepreneurs that raise
external ﬁnance through CMFs. Finally, we describe the consumption and investment decisions
of entrepreneurs and households, present aggregation results and characterize the competitive
equilibrium. In section 4, we illustrate the main properties of the model in steady state and
carry out a sensitivity analysis. In section 5, we look at the implication for allocations of
structural diﬀerences in ﬁnancial markets. We do so by ﬁtting the model to the US and the
euro area. First, we review the existing evidence on diﬀerences in the intermediation activities
a n di nt h eﬁnancial structure of the corporate sector in the two blocks. Then, we present a
calibration of the model that replicates in steady state the outlined key diﬀerences. In section
6, we conclude and outline our future research on this topic.
2T h e M o d e l
We cast the diﬀerent role of corporate bonds and bank loans into an otherwise standard DSGE
model with credit frictions and agency costs, where we maintain the assumption of one-period
maturity of the debt. The environment builds upon the ”output model” presented in CF.
2.1 The sequence of events
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical inﬁnitely-lived households, a
continuum of ﬁrms owned by inﬁnitely lived risk-neutral entrepreneurs facing idiosyncratic risk
in production, and two types of zero-proﬁt ﬁnancial intermediaries.
At the beginning of each period, households decide optimally how much to work, to con-
sume, to invest and to lend. Lending is carried out through banks and CMFs. By funding a
large number of entrepreneurs, these ﬁnancial intermediaries eliminate the risk of idiosyncratic
entrepreneurial uncertainty and guarantee a sure return to the households.
Each ﬁrm, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], starts the period with an endowment of physical capital
and with a constant returns to scale production technology that uses labor and capital as
5inputs. The market value of the initial capital stock is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the input bill.
Hence, producing ﬁrms need to raise external ﬁnance.
Each ﬁrm i is hit by a sequence of three idiosyncratic productivity shocks, ε1,it,ε 2,it and
ε3,it.T h eﬁrst shock, ε1,it, is publicly observed and it realizes before ﬁrms take their ﬁnancing
decisions (whether to use CMF or bank ﬁnance). The second shock, ε2,it is a signal that occurs
after ﬁrms take ﬁnancing decisions but before borrowing occurs. This signal is not observed
by anyone (not even the entrepreneur). Information on the realization of this shock can be
acquired by the ﬁnancial intermediaries at a cost that is proportional to the ﬁrm’s initial net
worth. The third shock, ε3,it, realizes after borrowing and is observable to the entrepreneur
only. It can be monitored by ﬁnancial intermediaries at the end of the period, at a cost that
is proportional to the size of the ﬁrm’s project. We deﬁne the diﬀerence between banks and
CMFs to be that only banks spend resources to acquire information about the signal, ε2,it.
This allows them to minimize the ineﬃcient liquidation of ﬁrms and to build a reputation for
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility.
Conditional on the realization of the ﬁrst ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c kε1,it, the entrepreneur chooses
w h e t h e ro rn o tt op r o d u c ea n dw h a tﬁnancing instrument to use. Entrepreneurs facing high
risk of default at the end of the period (a low ε1,it) either choose not to produce or to produce
and borrow through the bank, because this minimizes the risk of costly liquidation. The
ﬂexibility provided by bank loans entails a cost through high repayments in good states. Hence,
entrepreneurs facing low risk (a high ε1,it) prefer ﬁnancing through CMFs.
Loans take the form of intra-period trade credit calculated in units of the output good,
as in CF. Firms obtain labor and capital inputs from the households against the promise to
deliver the factor payments at the end of the period. This requires a contractual arrangement,
which is supplied by the ﬁnancial intermediaries. Since credit arrangements are all settled at
the end of the period, the competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries break exactly even on average.
Firms that decide to ﬁnance through CMFs obtain a certain amount of trade credit at the
beginning of the period against the promise to repay the agreed-upon amount after production
has occurred. If the realization of the ﬁrm’s overall productivity factor is not suﬃcient to
guarantee repayment, the ﬁrm’s default triggers costly monitoring by the CMF. The observed
ﬁrm’s output is then fully seized and the initial net worth of the ﬁrm is completely lost.
Firms that ﬁnance through bank loans face a diﬀerent problem. At the beginning of the
period, the ﬁrm pays up-front to the bank an evaluation cost to gather information about the
6second ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shock, ε2,it, which is costly to observe for everyone. Con-
ditional on the realization of this shock, the ﬁrm has the option to obtain trade credit and
produce or to ”drop out” of production. If the realization of ε2,it is low, the ﬁrm decides not to
produce and keeps the fraction of the initial net worth remaining after the payment of the fee.
If the realization exceeds a certain threshold, the ﬁrm decides to produce. Firms that produce
obtain a certain amount of trade credit against the promise to repay an agreed-upon amount
a tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,a si nt h ec a s eo fC M Fﬁnance. The diﬀerence is that, when the bank
sets the terms of the loan, the ﬁrm faces lower uncertainty on its overall productivity factor.
After the realization of the last shock, ε3,it, production takes place. Entrepreneurs keep
part of their output for own consumption and investment, and use the rest to settle trade credit
accounts. If they default on loans, production is veriﬁed at a cost by the ﬁnancial intermediary
and all resources in the hands of the entrepreneurs are sized. The timing of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial








ε2 is realised but not 
observed.
The firm borrows and 
produces.
ε3 is realised and 
production occurs.
If ε1ε2ε3 is sufficiently 
high, bonds are repaid. 
Otherwise,  the firm is 
liquidated.
ε2 is realised and observed by the 
bank at a cost that is a fraction τ of 
the firm’s net worth n
If ε1ε2 is sufficiently high, the 
firm borrows and produces.
If ε1ε2 is low, the firm decides not 
to produce. It repays a fraction τn
to the bank and keeps (1-τ)n.
ε3 is realised and 
production occurs.
If ε1ε2ε3 is sufficiently 
high, bank loans are 
repaid. 
Otherwise, the firm is 
liquidated.
The firm decides not to 
borrow and not to produce.
t t+1
Figure 1: The timing of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions
72.2 The environment
2.2.1 Households




βt[lnct + η(1 − lt)], 0 <β<1, (1)
where β is the households’ discount rate, ct is consumption, lt denotes working hours and η is
a preference parameter.
The households are also the owners of the ﬁnancial intermediaries, to which they lend and
f r o mw h i c ht h e yb o r r o wo nat r a d ec r e d i ta c c o u n tt ob es e t t l e da tt h ee n do fe a c hp e r i o d .
Thus, the representative household faces the budget constraints,
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt ≤ wtlt + rtkt. (2)
2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0,1],e a c ho w n e db ya n




where Kit and Hit denote the ﬁrm-level capital and labor, respectively. ε1,it,ε 2,it and ε3,it
are random iid productivity shocks, which occur at diﬀerent times during the period. All
three shocks have mean unity,3 are mutually independent and have aggregate distribution
functions denoted by Φ1,Φ2 and Φ3 respectively. Per independence assumption, these are also
the marginal distributions.
Each entrepreneur i s t a r t st h ep e r i o dw i t ha na m o u n to fc a p i t a lzit, whose market value
provides the ﬁrm with an amount of initial net worth, nit. Since the ﬁrm’s net worth is lower
than the amount of ﬁnance necessary to undertake production, each entrepreneur needs to
raise external funds to ﬁnance the input bill xit, where
xit = wtHit + rtKit,
3An aggregate technology shock can be introduced by assuming that the mean ε1t of the ﬁrst entrepreneur-
speciﬁc technology shock is not unitary.
8and where wt denotes the real wage and rt the rental rate on capital.
Entrepreneurs are inﬁnitely lived, risk-neutral and behave as ”Euler equation entrepre-
neurs” in the language of CF. Their discount factor is given by βγ, where β is the discount
factor of households and 0 <γ<1. The assumption that entrepreneurs are more impatient
than regular households, makes them demand a higher internal rate of return to investment
and thus opens the room for trade between households and entrepreneurs despite the agency
costs of ﬁnance. When the internal expected rate of return oﬀsets the entrepreneurs discount
factor, entrepreneurs are individually indiﬀerent between consuming and investing.
2.2.3 Agency costs and financial intermediation
Denote as Ωat,Ωbt and Ωct the subset of ﬁr m st h a ta tt i m et choose to abstain from production
after seeing ε1,it, approach a bank and (depending on ε2,it) obtain a loan, or raise external
ﬁnance through CMFs.
Let ωit be the residual uncertain productivity factor at contracting time, i.e. when ﬁrms
approach ﬁnancial intermediaries to obtain trade credit, and Φω and ϕω be respectively its





ε2,itε3,it for CMF ﬁnance
ε3,it for bank ﬁnance
To produce, each entrepreneur has to request trade credit in the amount xit−˜ nit, where ˜ nit
= nit in case of CMF ﬁnance and ˜ nit =( 1−τ)nit in case of bank ﬁnance. Firms that decide to
ﬁnance their production through bank loans need to pay in advance of production the up-front
fee τnit, which is used by the bank to acquire information about the signal ε2,it. Therefore,
they request trade credit xit − (1 − τ)nit from the bank for total funds at hand of xit.T h e
cost τnit is not faced by ﬁrms that ﬁnance through CMFs, as these ﬁnancial intermediaries
do not invest in acquiring information about the ﬁrm. Hence, these ﬁrms request trade credit
xit − nit for total funds at hand of xit.
The ﬁnancial arrangements between entrepreneurs and ﬁnancial intermediaries take the
form of debt contracts. Each ﬁnancial intermediary stands ready to ﬁnance a project size
that is a ﬁxed proportion of the ﬁrm’s net worth, xit = ζ˜ nit. Each entrepreneur agrees to
repay an amount (1 + r
j
it)(xit − ˜ nit) at the end of the period, where r
j
it for j = b,c is the
risk premium charged by banks or CMFs respectively. The fact that only the entrepreneur
can costlessly observe the idiosyncratic shock ωit, and thus total production at the end of the
9period, introduces a moral hazard problem. After the realization of the uncertain productivity
factor ωit, the entrepreneur learns the true outcome of production in units of goods, yit =
ε1,itωitHα
itK1−α
it . The entrepreneur is able to repay only if ωit exceeds a certain threshold, ω
j
it.
However, he or she has an incentive to under-report the realization of the unobserved produc-
tivity factor and to declare default, unless costly monitoring is carried out by the ﬁnancial
intermediary. We assume a monitoring technology that uses a fraction µ of the ﬁrm’s output
to monitor production.
Under the assumption that xit = ζ˜ nit, when ωit = ε3,it (CMF ﬁnance), the optimal con-
tract is a prestate agreement on the circumstances under which monitoring has to occur. It
establishes a threshold level ω
j
it for the uncertain productivity factor above which the entre-
preneur repays its debt and keeps any residual proﬁts. Below that threshold, the entrepreneur
declares default, the ﬁnancial intermediary monitors the ﬁrm and seizes its entire production.
As proﬁts accruing to the entrepreneur in case of bankruptcy are zero, such a contract induces
the entrepreneur to tell the truth about its current production and to repay the agreed-upon
amount to the intermediary whenever possible.4
When ωit = ε2,itε3,it (bank ﬁnance), the terms of the contract depend on whether we allow
for the existence of lotteries.5 Since agency costs are a resource loss for the economy and
entrepreneurs are risk neutral, the optimal contract (characterized in Appendix B) takes the
form of a lottery. It is given by a state-dependent level of the threshold under which monitoring
has to occur and of the up-front fee to be paid to the bank. Under such a contract, banks
would conﬁscate the net worth of ﬁrms facing low realizations of the ﬁrst idiosyncratic shock to
subsidize production of ﬁrms experiencing high realizations of the same shock. If the shock is
lower than a certain treshold, the ﬁrm would have to surrender its entire net worth to the bank.
If the shock is higher than that treshold, the ﬁrm would get full funding at the lowest possible
cost. Repayments would be minimized and so would be the probability of default and expected
4When ﬁrms are ex-ante identical, as in CF, the optimal contract is a prestate agreement that ﬁxes the
threshold level for the uncertain productivity factor and the ﬁrm’s project size. Such a contract is eﬃcient
because it minimizes expected bankruptcy costs, given incentive compatibility. In our model with ex-ante
heterogeneity, ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of their credit-worthiness. When the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock
ε1t is unbounded, ﬁnancial intermediaries would ﬁnance projects of inﬁnite size for those ﬁrms experiencing
extremely large values of that shock. The assumption that the project size is a ﬁxed share of the ﬁrm’s initial
n e tw o r t he n s u r e st h a ta l lﬁrms can raise positive and ﬁnite amounts of external ﬁnance.
5On the potential to use lotteries to improve the allocations, see for instance Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
10monitoring costs. The contract is optimal because it minimizes agency costs and, since the
entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, improve their welfare. A frequent objection to contracts that
allow for cross-state subsidization is that lotteries are not observed in ﬁnancial markets. One
possible explanation is that investors are risk-averse, an element that is neglected in standard
models with agency costs. For this reason, the possibility of cross-state subsidization is often
assumed away in the literature. We follow this practice in the current context. In the absence
of cross-state subsidization, the optimal contract is given by an up-front fee to be paid to the
bank and a prestate agreement on the threshold ωb
it, below which monitoring has to occur.
3A n a l y s i s
We analyze the behavior of the various classes of agents in this economy and we characterize
the competitive equilibrium. First, we show that the presence of agency costs in ﬁnancial
intermediation translates into a ﬁrm-speciﬁc markup that entrepreneurs need to charge over
marginal costs. Then, we characterize the contract between ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries
and we derive the endogenous ﬁnancial structure. We proceed by characterizing consumption
and investment decisions of entrepreneurs and households. Finally, we present aggregation
results, we impose market clearing and we characterize the competitive equilibrium.
3.1 Factor prices and the markup
Each entrepreneur i s t a r t st h ep e r i o dw i t ha na m o u n to fc a p i t a lzit. The entrepreneur’s net
worth6, nit, is given by the market value of his capital stock, calculated as the to-be-earned
factor payments plus the depreciated capital stock,7
nit =( 1− δ + rt)zit. (3)
To raise external ﬁnance, ﬁrms need to sign a contract with the ﬁnancial intermediaries,
which ﬁxes the size of the project xit. Normalizing goods prices, the ﬁrm’s demand for labor
6One possible interpretation is that entrepreneurs sell their capital stock at the beginning of the period
against trade credit nit
7Entrepreneurs’ net worth should include also a ﬁxed income component (e.g. a constant lump-sum subsidy
ψ received from the households). This would ensure that, if the entrepreneur defaults in period t − 1,i t sn e t
worth in period t is non zero, so that he can obtain external ﬁnance and eventually produce. Since introducing
a small constant subsidy does not aﬀect aggregate dynamics in the economy, we abstract from it.





it − wtHit − rtKit
¤
subject to the ﬁnancing constraint
xit = wtHit + rtKit.
Here the expectation E[·] is taken with respect to the productivity variables yet unknown at





ε1,it for CMF ﬁnanced ﬁrms
ε1,itε2,it for bank ﬁnanced ﬁrms
Denote the Lagrange multiplier on the ﬁnancing constraint as sit −1. Assuming a binding
constraint (as it will be with the optimal ﬁnancing contract), optimality implies that























ε1,itqt for CMF ﬁnance
ε1,itε2,itqt for bank ﬁnance
(4)










We can interpret qt as an aggregate distortion in production arising from the presence
of the ﬁnancing constraint in the economy and sit as a markup, which ﬁrms need to charge
in order to cover the agency costs of ﬁnancial intermediation. Note that sit is ﬁrm-speciﬁc:
depending on what is already known about ﬁnal ﬁrm productivity, i.e. depending on ε1,it and
(for bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms) ε2,it,t h eﬁnancing constraint may be more or less severe. In CF as
12in most of the literature, nothing is known before ﬁrms produce, i.e., E[ε1,itε2,itε3,it]=1and
sit = qt. Aggregating across ﬁrms, we obtain
wtHt = αxt
rtKt =( 1 − α)xt.
To calculate aggregate output, we need to ﬁrst learn more about the ﬁnancial contracts and
funds obtained.
3.2 Financial structure
We start by solving the optimal contract between ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries. We
then proceed to characterize thresholds for the realization of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc markup sit that
determine the ﬁrm’s decision of whether or not to borrow and of what ﬁnancing instrument
to use. We also characterize how the aggregate variable that reﬂects the importance of the
ﬁnancing distortions in the economy, qt, aﬀects the distribution of ﬁrms among alternative
ﬁnancing instruments.
3.2.1 The costly state veriﬁcation contract
The contract is a prestate agreement on a threshold for the uncertain productivity factor ω
j
it,
below which the entrepreneur defaults and gets monitored. Recall that the presence of agency
c o s t si m p l i e st h a to u t p u ti sv a l u e da tam a r k u psit over marginal costs,
yit = sitωitxit
Each entrepreneur agrees to borrow the amount xit − ˜ nit and to repay the amount (1 +
r
j
it)(xit − ˜ nit)=sitω
j
itxit at the end of the period. He or she repays if ωit ≥ ω
j
it, and de-










g(ωj)=1− f(ωj) − µΦω(ωj) (7)
as the expected shares of ﬁnal output accruing respectively to an entrepreneur and to a lender,
after stipulating a contract that ﬁxes the threshold at ω
j








sitg(ωit)xit ≥ xit − ˜ nit (9)
xit = ξ˜ nit, (10)
where ξ ≥ 1. The contract maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return subject to the lender
being indiﬀerent between lending out funds or retaining them, as ensured by (9), and to (10).
Since the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁts are zero in case of default, he or she has an incentive
to reveal the truth and to repay whenever possible. Notice that, since loans are intra-period,
the opportunity cost of lending for the intermediary equals the amount of loans itself, xit−˜ nit.
Lemma 1 The expected share of ﬁnal output accruing to the entrepreneur is monotonically




it) < 0. The expected share accruing to the lender is




























< 0. Then, it would be possible to increase expected proﬁts
of the ﬁrm, sitf(ω
j
it)ξ˜ nit, by reducing ω
j
it while increasing expected proﬁts of the ﬁnancial
intermediary, sitg(ω
j
it)ξ˜ nit. Hence, ω
j
it could not be a solution to the contract.










Proof: Notice that f (0) =
R ∞
0 ωΦω (dω)=1and g(0) = 0. Then, Lemma 1 implies that the
unique interior solution to problem (8) is given by (11).
The terms of the contract can be written as
ω
j
it = ωj(sit), (12)
where sit satisﬁes (4).
Lemma 3 The threshold ω
j
it is a decreasing function of the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k - u psit.











Lemma 3 states that, the higher the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k - u psit, the lower the threshold
for the idiosyncratic productivity shock, ω
j
it, below which the entrepreneur defaults and is




∂qt < 0. For a given realization of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁcs h o c k ,ah i g h e rqt reduces the threshold that triggers default and monitoring.
143.2.2 Bank loan continuation
Consider the situation of bank ﬁnance, where ε1,it and ε2,it are known. The entrepreneur will
proceed with the bank loan only if his expected payoﬀ exceeds the opportunity costs of renting
his capital to others, i.e. if sitf(ωb(sit))ξ ≥ 1, where sit = ε1,itε2,itqt.
Proposition 4 At h r e s h o l df o rsit = ε1,itε2,itqt, below which the entrepreneur does not proceed
with the bank loan, exists and is unique. It is given by a constant sd that solves the condition
sitf(ωb(sit))ξ =1 . (13)
Proof: Notice that expected proﬁts from proceeding with the bank, sitf(ωb(sit))ξ, are zero







∂sit < 0. Hence, a solution to
condition (13), taken with equality, exists and is unique. Moreover, the solution is constant
across ﬁrms and time.
3.2.3 The choice of the ﬁnancing instrument
At the beginning of the period, after the random variable ε1,it realizes, the entrepreneur chooses
whether or not to borrow and how to ﬁnance production. For simplicity, since we characterize
the decision of entrepreneur i at time t, we drop the subscripts.
The expected payoﬀ of an entrepreneur, who proceeds with bank ﬁnance conditional on










The possibility for the entrepreneur to await the further news ε2 before deciding whether or
not to proceed with the bank loan provides option value.
The expected payoﬀ of an entrepreneur, who proceeds with CMF ﬁnance conditional on
the realization of ε1, is Fc(s)n,,w h e r es = ε1q and
Fc(s)=sf(ωc(s))ξ
Finally, the expected payoﬀ for an entrepreneur, who abstains from production is simply
n. Note in particular, that all payoﬀ f u n c t i o n sa r el i n e a ri nn e tw o r t hn.
Knowing its own mark-up s = ε1q, each entrepreneur chooses his or her best option, leading
to the overall payoﬀ F(s)n, where
F(s)=m a x {1;Fb(s);Fc(s)}. (14)
15Conditional on s, entrepreneurs split into three sets: Ωat, the set of entrepreneurs that
abstains from raising external ﬁnance in period t; Ωbt, the set of entrepreneurs that sign a
contract with banks, and Ωct, the set of CMF-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs. We show that these
three sets are, in fact, intervals in terms of the idiosyncratic ﬁrst productivity shock ε1 and we
characterize how q moves the bounds of these intervals.
In the analysis below, we assume that conditions (A1) and (A2) are satisﬁed.
(A1) Fb0(s) ≥ 0;
(A2) Fb0(s) <Fc0(s), for all s.


















Φ2(dε2) > 0. (15)
As u ﬃcient condition for (15) to be satisﬁed is that ϕε2(
sd
s ) < 1, since the expected return
evaluated at the threshold sd,s df(ωb(sd))ξ, is one, and f0(ωb) ∂ωb
∂sε2 > 0.
The condition imposed by (A2) is also mild. Intuitively, ﬁrms with a low realization of the
productivity shock ε1 (a low s) have expectations of low returns from undertaking production





For those ﬁrms, the gain from minimizing the possibility of liquidation, (1 − τ)Φ2(
sd
s ), is rela-
tively more important. If s increases, the expected return from production increases both for
bank- and for CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁrms. However, the increase is higher in the case of bond ﬁnance
because intermediation costs are lower. Hence, there will be a threshold above which expected
proﬁts from production for CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁrms exceed those for bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
(A1) and (A2) ensure uniqueness of the thresholds sb and sc.
Proposition 5 Under (A1), a threshold for s = ε1q, below which the entrepreneur decides
not to raise external ﬁnance, exists and is unique. It is given by a constant sb that solves the
condition
Fb(s)=1 . (16)
Proof: Notice that Fb(0) = 1−τ.Under (A1), there is a unique cutoﬀ point sb, which satisﬁes
the condition Fb(s)=1 . Moreover, this point is constant across ﬁrms and time.
Proposition 6 Under (A1) and (A2), a threshold for s = ε1q above which entrepreneurs sign
ac o n t r a c tw i t ht h eC M F ,e x i s t sa n di su n i q u e . I ti sg i v e nb yac o n s t a n tsc that solves the
16condition
Fb(s)=Fc(s). (17)






> 0. As u ﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness of a thresh-
old is provided by (A2). The threshold sc is constant across ﬁrms and time.
Conditional on qt, entrepreneurs split into three sets that are intervals in terms of the ﬁrst
idiosyncratic productivity shock ε1,it,
Ωat = {ε1,it | ε1,it <s b/qt}
Ωbt = {ε1,it | sb/qt ≤ ε1,it ≤ sc/qt}
Ωct = {ε1,it | ε1,it >s c/qt}
for some constants sb, sc.
Notice that an increase in qt raises expected proﬁts from producing, conditional on the
realization of the ﬁrst ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, and reduces the thresholds for ε1,it,s b/qt and sc/qt.
Hence, an increase in qt decreases the share of ﬁrms that decide to abstain from production
and correspondingly increases the share of ﬁrms that raise external ﬁnance.
Notice also that condition (13) determines a threshold sd for the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k u p ,
below which ﬁrms that have signed a contract with banks decide to abstain. Recall that
sit = ε1,itε2,itqt for such ﬁrms. Then, a corresponding threshold for the second ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shock ε2,it c a nb ec o m p u t e da ssd/(qtε1,it). Conditional on the realization of ε1,it, an increase
in qt reduces the threshold for ε2,it and the share of ﬁrms that decide to abstain after having
signed a contract with a bank.
3.3 Aggregation
We are now ready to calculate aggregate variables. Given qt and total entrepreneurial net






















































where Φ2∗3 is the distribution function for the product ω = ε2ε3.
3.4 Consumption and investment decisions
Consumption and investment decisions of the households are described by the solution to their
problem, which is given by







(1 − δ + rt+1)
¾
. (22)
The entrepreneurial decision on consumption and on investment in capital, which will be
used as net worth in the following period, is described by the entrepreneurs’ intertemporal
Euler equation,
1=Et[βγ(1 − δ + rt+1)F(ε1,it+1qt+1)]. (23)
Observe that qt+1 is a function of wt+1 and rt+1. This equation then ties down a relationship
b e t w e e nt h e s et w of a c t o rp r i c e s .T h ee q u a t i o na l s op i n sd o w nt h ee v o l u t i o no fn e tw o r t ho ft h e
entrepreneurs, since they will elastically save and supply capital, so that factor prices satisfy
this equation exactly period by period.
Aggregate entrepreneurial consumption and investment need not exceed the end-of-period
real wealth of entrepreneurs,




Market clearing for capital, labor and output requires that
Kt = kt + zt, (25)
Ht = lt, (26)
yt = ct + et + ya
t + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt. (27)
183.6 Competitive equilibrium
Given the process of the idiosyncratic shocks, {ε1,it,ε 2,it,ε 3,it}, and the initial conditions
(k0,z 0), a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k - u p s ,{sit}
∞
t=0 ,




t=0 , constant thresholds
for the ﬁrm’s mark-up {sb,s c,s d}
∞
t=0 , demand functions for labor and capital {Hit,K it}
∞
t=0 ,
and consumption and investment decisions {eit,z i,t+1}
∞
t=0 , for i ∈ (0,1). It also consists of
aggregate factors {qt}
∞
t=0 , allocations {ct,l t,H t,K t,e t,x t,y t,ya
t }
∞
t=0 , laws of motion for the
capital stocks {kt+1,z t+1}
∞
t=0 , and prices {wt,r t} such that:
• Households maximize expected utility by choosing ct,h t and kt+1, subject to the budget
constraint, taking prices as given.
• Entrepreneurs choose Hit and Kit, for i ∈ (0,1), to maximize proﬁts, subject to the CRS
production technology and the ﬁnancing constraint, taking prices as given. Firm i, i ∈ Ωct
takes as given also the realization of the ﬁrst idiosyncratic productivity shock, ε1,it.F i r m
i, i ∈ Ωbt takes as given the realization of the ﬁrst two idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
ε1,it and ε2,it. Entrepreneurs also choose consumption, ei,t, and investment, zi,t+1, to
maximize their linear utility, subject to the budget constraint.
• Financial intermediaries and ﬁrms solve a costly state veriﬁcation problem. The solution
to this problem is a threshold level for the uncertain productivity factor ω
j
it,j= b,c.
When the productivity factor is lower than the threshold, the ﬁrm is monitored.
• The market clearing conditions for goods, loans, labor and capital hold.
The conditions for a competitive equilibrium can be summarized by the system of equations
(3), (4), (5), (12), (13), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (27), and
wtlt = αxt (28)
rt(kt + zt)=( 1 − α)xt. (29)
4 Steady state properties: a numerical analysis
We parameterize the model at the stochastic steady state, which is characterized in Appendix
A. The Appendix also describes the numerical procedure used to compute it. We assume that
19the iid productivity shocks v = ε1,ε 2,ε 3 are lognormally distributed, i.e. log(v) is normally
distributed with variance σ2
v and mean −σ2
v/2.A s a r e s u l t , ε2ε3 will also be lognormally
distributed, with the variance of log equal to σ2
ε2 + σ2
ε3.
We set a discount factor β = .98 and a depreciation rate δ = .02, l e a d i n gt oar e a li n t e r e s t
rate r =4 % . We choose α = .64 in the Cobb-Douglas production function and a coeﬃcient
in preferences so that labor equal .3 in steady state, η =2 .6. We set monitoring costs to be
approximately 15% of the ﬁrm’s output, µ = .15, in line with the values found in the empirical
literature cited below. We are then left with 6 parameters to set (ξ,τ,γ,σε1,σε2,σε3). In this
section we set them arbitrarily at values that are convenient to show the qualitative properties
of the model in steady state, i.e. τ = .11,ξ=1 .6,σ ε1 = .26,σε2 = .46,σε3 = .13,γ= .704.I n
section 5 below, we calibrate the model and choose the parameters to match stylized facts on
the ﬁnancial structure of the corporate sector in the US and in the euro area.
In Figure 2, we show expected proﬁts for entrepreneurs. Panel (a) plots expected proﬁts
from abstaining from production, from signing a contract with the bank and from signing a
contract with the CMF, as a function of the ﬁrm’s mark-up, s = ε1q. The intersection points
of the three curves provide the cutoﬀ points, sb and sc, which determine the ﬁnancial market
structure in steady state. The panel also shows the region corresponding to the mean of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k - u ps, plus/minus two standard deviations. After the realization of ε1, 95%
of the existing ﬁrms’ markups lie within this region. Panel (b) shows how expected proﬁts from
bank ﬁnance move with the up-front fee τ. When τ =0 , expected proﬁts from bank ﬁnance
always exceed those from abstaining or from CMF ﬁnance. All ﬁrms raise external ﬁnance
through banks. When τ is extremely large (.3 in the ﬁgure), the option value of acquiring
more information is not large enough to oﬀset the cost of paying the fee. All ﬁrms either
abstain or use CMF ﬁnance. Only for some intermediate range of τ, ﬁrms that decide to
produce diﬀerentiate in terms of their ﬁnancing choice. They split into bank ﬁnance and CMF
ﬁnance according to the realization of their markup s.
Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁnancial decisions of ﬁrms. Panel (a) plots how ﬁrms allocate
among ﬁnancial instruments. Conditional on the steady state value of the aggregate variable
q, ﬁrms experiencing a productivity shock ε1 ≤ sb/q decide to abstain from raising external
ﬁnance. Firms with sb/q ≤ ε1 ≤ sc/q sign a contract with banks and ﬁrms with ε1 ≥ sc/q sign
a contract with CMFs. Among ﬁrms that raise bank ﬁnance, those experiencing a productivity
shock below a certain threshold, ε2 ≤ sd/ε1q, decide to repay the bank an amount τnand not
20to proceed to the production stage. Panel (b) plots the threshold sd/ε1q, over the range of
mark-ups (sb/q,sc/q) that give raise to bank ﬁnance, as a function of ε1. Panel (c) shows the
probability that ε2 ≥ sd/ε1q, as a function of ε1. The larger ε1, t h el o w e rt h et h r e s h o l dl e v e l
for ε2 and the higher the probability that the ﬁrm will produce, conditional on having signed
a contract with a bank. Under the chosen parameterization, the share of ﬁrms that abstain,
conditional on having signed a contract with a bank, is .57.
Figure 4 plots the steady state distribution of ﬁrms among production activities. Firms
that do not undertake production are those that decide not to raise external ﬁnance because
ε1 ≤ sb/q, and those that sign a contract with the bank but, after having observed the second
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock, decide to drop out of production. For these ﬁrms, sb/q ≤ ε1 ≤ sc/q and
ε2 ≤ sd/qε1.
Figure 5 and 6 plot the results from a sensitivity analysis, which is carried out by modifying
one parameter at a time. The ﬁr s te x p e r i m e n ti st ol o o ka tt h ee ﬀect of diﬀerent entrepreneurial
discount factors by changing the value of q. Notice that this is equivalent to changing the value
of γ. For a given value of r and σε1, the steady state version of equation (23) maps uniquely
values of q into values of γ. Ah i g h e rq leads to higher expected proﬁts from production. This
increases the share of ﬁrms that sign a contract with intermediaries and reduces the number of
ﬁrms that abstain. It also reduces the share of ﬁrms that sign a contract with banks relative
to CMFs. Intuitively, a higher q increases the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts from raising external
ﬁnance through banks as well as CMFs. However, the higher is q, the lower is the beneﬁt
arising from the possibility to drop out of production that banks provide. Figure 5 illustrates
these mechanisms by plotting the shares of ﬁrms in steady state as a function of q.P a n e l( a ) -
(c) reports respectively the share of ﬁrms that abstain from production, sign a contract with
the bank and sign a contract with the CMF. A higher q increases expected proﬁts, decreasing
the share of ﬁrms that decide not to raise external ﬁnance (panel (a)) and the share of ﬁrms
that sign a contract with the bank (panel (b)), while increasing the share of CMF ﬁnanced
ﬁrms (panel (c)). Panel (d) plots the overall fraction of ﬁrms that default and are monitored
at the end of the period. For a given ε1, the increase in proﬁts reduces the risk of the ﬁrm to
default. However, it also induces ﬁrms with high risk to undertake productive activities. The
overall eﬀect is to increase the realized share of default in the economy for low levels of q and
to decrease it afterwards. Finally, panels (e)-(f) plot respectively the share of ﬁrms that, after
having signed a contract with a bank, abstain or default.
21The second experiment we carry out is to change the value of some key parameters, such as
τ, σε1 and σε2, as reported in Figure 6. Panel (a) reports the results from increasing the costs
of collecting information by banks. We raise τ from the .11 to .16 and show with thick lines the
new threshold levels, sb/q and sc/q. Not surprisingly, the share of ﬁrms that sign a contract
with banks decreases. Moreover, a larger fraction of ﬁrms decides to abstain because the costs
of ﬁnancial intermediation (in terms of cost of loans or risk of default) are too large. Panel (b)
reports the results from increasing the degree of heterogeneity in the economy. We raise σε1
from .26 to .46. Firms experience with higher probability low realizations of the productivity
shock ε1 before taking their ﬁnancing decisions. Therefore a larger share of ﬁr m sd e c i d e st o
abstain. Finally, panel (c) plots the distribution of ﬁrms and new thresholds as thick lines,
when σε2 is increased from .46 to .56. With a larger variance of the signal σε2, ﬁrms give a
higher value to the possibility to acquire more information through banks. The share of ﬁrms
that raise bank ﬁnance increases.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis
5 Comparing the US and the euro area: a calibration exercise
In this section, we present evidence on diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure of the corporate
sector in the US and in the euro area. We calibrate the model to capture some of the key
diﬀerences in steady state. Finally, we provide model-based answers to the questions raised
above: What are the causes of diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure? Do these diﬀerences have
implications for allocations?
255.1 Evidence on intermediation and ﬁnancial structures
We review the empirical evidence on the costs of ﬁnancing through bank loans or corporate
bonds in the US and in the euro area. Some distinguishing features emerge: the debt to equity
ratio and the ratio of bank ﬁnance to bond ﬁnance are lower in the US than in the euro area,
while the converse is true for the interest rate spread on bank loans.
Bank loans
We compute the average gross spread on bank loans to be 298 bps in the US and 267 bps in
the euro area over the period 1997-2003.8 Carey and Nini (2004) conﬁrm the existence of higher
mean interest rate spreads on bank syndicated loans in the US relative to Europe. They ﬁnd
that the diﬀerence in gross spreads over LIBOR in US versus EMU is 29.8 bps. These ﬁndings
are also conﬁrmed by existing calculations of net interest margins in the banking industry by
country. Cecchetti (1999) reports interest rate margins for the US in 1996 to be 2.68. In the
same year, the average interest rate margin for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain is 2.04.
Corporate bonds
We compute the average spread of US corporate bonds for the period 1997-2003 to be 339
bps.9 Mahajan and Fraser (1986) ﬁnd no evidence of diﬀerences among bond spreads in the US
and the euro area. Using more recent data, Carey and Nini (2004) examine spreads estimated
using daily Merrill Lynch bond index yields and swap data for the period 1999-2003 for A-
and BBB-rated ﬁrms. They ﬁnd only small mean and median diﬀerences, after accounting for
duration and currency eﬀects.10
8T h eU Ss p r e a di sd e ﬁned as the prime rate on bank loans to business minus the commercial paper rate.
Source: Federal Resrve Board Table H15. The spread for the euro area is deﬁned as the interest rate on loans
(up to 1 year of maturity) to non-ﬁnancial corporations minues the three-month interest rate, MU12 average
based on country reporting to BIS. Source: European Central Bank.
9The spread is deﬁned as the average of the average yield to maturity on selected long term bonds (rated
Aaa and Baa) minus the 3-months Treasury Bill. Source: Federal Resrve Board Table H15.
10Our model assumes no ﬁxed cost of issuance of corporate bonds. Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) use the
IFR Platinum database compiled by Thomson Financial Studies, which covers 3,110 bonds issued by the private
sector between 1994 and 2001. They ﬁnd that average gross issuance fees over the period considered are small:
0.82% of the amount raised for bonds issued in US dollars and 0.89% for bonds issued in euros. Given the size
of these fees and the similarity among US and euro area, we abstract from them in our analysis.
26Default rates
Aggregate default rates from the Dun and Bradstreet data set are reported in Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997). They amount to an annual rate of 3.9%. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) compute the average annual ﬁrms failures in the post World War II period at 3%.
Helwege and Kleiman (1996) ﬁnd an average aggregate annual default rate for all high yield
bond issuers of around 4.5% for the period 1981-1995. Ammer and Packer (2000) examine
bonds of 492 issuers present in Moody’s database over the period 1983-1988 and compare
default rates among US ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that the average annual default rate
f o rU Sn o n - ﬁnancial corporations is 1.93% while the rate is lower for foreign ﬁrms (0.54%). The
default rate is much larger on US corporate bonds. The average for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms rated
from Aaa to C is 6.2% while the corresponding average for foreign ﬁrms is 4.6%. On the basis
of probit estimates, the authors argue that, after controlling for the rating composition of each
sectorial pool, similar default rates would apply to US and foreign ﬁrms in the sample. Finally,
Moody’s Investors Service (2003) documents that among US non-ﬁnancial corporate issuers
that default without going bankrupted, the default rate on loans is approximately 20% lower
than the overall default rate on bonds, for the period 1995-2003. For European non-ﬁnancial
corporate issuers, the default rate on loans is approximately 27% lower than the overall default
rate on bonds, for the period 1990-2003.
Bankruptcy costs
On bankruptcy costs, Warner (1977) estimates small direct costs in a study of 11 railroad
b a n k r u p t c i e s ,w i t ham a x i m u mo f5 . 3 %o ft h eﬁrm’s value. Altman (1984) ﬁnds that the direct
costs (those explicitly paid by the debtors in the bankruptcy process) plus indirect costs (those
related to the loss of customers, suppliers and employees, and the managerial expenses) tend
to be higher for industrial ﬁrms, between 12.1% and 16.7% at the bankruptcy ﬁling date. The
largest estimate is reported by Alderson and Betker (1995), which quantify bankruptcy costs
at 36% of the ﬁrm’s value.
27Financial structure
We compute the ratios of bank ﬁnance to bond ﬁnance. For the US, the average ratio
over the period 1997-2003 is 0.75.11 For the euro area, the ratio over the same period is 7.3.12
Over the period 1997-2003, we also compute the debt to equity ratio for the US non-farm,
non-ﬁnancial corporate business sector, which averaged 0.41.13 For the euro area, the debt to
equity ratio for non-ﬁnancial corporations is 0.61 over the period 1997-2002.14
Table 1 summarizes the evidence just described.
Table 1. Summary table of facts
Variable US Period EA Period
Risk premium bonds 0.034 1997-2003 as in US 1999-2003
Risk premium loans 0.030 1997-2003 0.027 1997-2003








Bank to bond ﬁnance 0.75 1997-2003 7.3 1997-2003
Debt to equity 0.41 1997-2003 0.61 1997-2002
5.2 Calibration
We set α = .64,δ = .02,β = .98,µ = .15, and η =2 .6 to obtain l = .3. W ec h o o s et h e
remaining free parameters to match selected facts about ﬁnancial markets in the US and in
the euro area. We consider three diﬀerent versions of the model.
11Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Table L 101. Securities are the sum of commercial paper, municipal
securities and corporate bonds.
12Loans are those taken from euro area MFIs and other ﬁnancial corporations by non-ﬁnancial corporations.
Securities are deﬁned as securities other than shares issued by non-ﬁnancial corporations. Source: Euro area
Flow of Funds.
13Debt is deﬁned as credit market instruments (sum of commercial paper, municipal securities, corporate
bonds, bank loans, other loans and advances, mortgages) over the market value of equities outstanding (including
corporate farm equities). Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.102. Masulis (1988) reports a ratio of debt
to equity for US corporations in the range 0.5-0.75 for the period 1937-1984. The ratio exhibited a downward
trend over the last decades due to ﬁnancial innovations.
14Debt includes loans, debt securities issued and pension fund reserves of non-ﬁnancial corporations. Equity
includes quoted and non-quoted equity. Source: Euro area Flow of Funds.
28Benchmark-CF. This is a benchmark model with no ex-ante heterogeneity and a single type
of ﬁnancial intermediary (as in CF). It is obtained by setting τ =1and σε1 = σε2 =0 . The
parameter ξ is then set to match the ﬁrm’s debt to equity ratio (.41 in the US and .61 in the
euro area), while γ and σε3 are set to match the evidence on aggregate default rates and risk
premia (aggregate default being 4.5% and average risk premia being 3.4% both for the US and
the euro area).
Benchmark-DFU . This is a benchmark model with ex-ante heterogeneity and a single type of
ﬁnancial intermediary. We build this benchmark by setting τ =1and σε2 =0 . The parameter
ξ is set to match the ﬁrm’s debt to equity ratio in each of the two blocks, γ and σε3 to match
the evidence on aggregate default rates and risk premia, and σε1 is set to the value used in
model-DFU below.
Model-DFU. The model is calibrated to minimize the squared log-deviation of the model
predictions from the data, as summarized in Table 3, for each of the two blocks.
Table 2. Parameters in the alternative models









US benchmark-CF 1 .65 1.41 0 0 .561 .315 .315
US benchmark-DFU 1 .68 1.41 .13 0 .564 .318 .335
US model-DFU .021 .65 1.41 .13 .292 .590 .433 .450
EA benchmark-CF 1 .46 1.61 0 0 .561 .315 .315
EA benchmark-DFU 1 .46 1.61 .09 0 .562 .316 .324
EA model-DFU .016 .34 1.61 .09 .400 .536 .447 .455
Table 2 reports the parameter values selected for each of the three models, for the US and
the euro area. It also reports the sum of the variances of the shocks ε2 and ε3, i.e. of the
uncertain productivity factors, and the sum of all three variances. Notice that σε1 provides a
measure of the public information available in the ﬁnancial market, i.e. the information known
to ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries before signing the contract. A larger σε1 allows ﬁnancial
intermediaries to discriminate ﬁrms according to their risk. Credit worthy ﬁrms are those that,
having experienced a high realization of the ﬁrst shock, face a relatively low risk of default at
the end of the period. On the other hand, σε2 provides a measure of the amount of private
information, which is costly to acquire and can only be obtained by banks.
29The table shows that diﬀerences arise in the parameters of the three models. In the
benchmark-CF model, the only uncertainty arises from the third idiosyncratic shock, ε3. For
the US, a standard deviation of .561 for ε3 and a coeﬃcient γ of .65 are able to reproduce
an average risk premium and an aggregate default rate in line with the data. In the bench-
mark DFU model, where the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity is ﬁxed at σε1 = .13, the overall
uncertainty at contracting time is still due only to ε3. However, a slightly higher standard
deviation σε3 is necessary to produce the same average risk premium and default rate. The
reason is that a higher σε1 corresponds to higher disclosure of public information in the ﬁnan-
cial market, which allows intermediaries to discriminate ﬁrms according to their risk. A larger
standard deviation of the unexpected productivity at contracting time (σε3)i st h u sn e c e s s a r y
to generate the same aggregate risk premium and default rate.
Comparing the models for the US and the euro area, the table shows that the variance of
ε3 is unchanged in the benchmark-CF models of the two blocks. The diﬀerent ratio of debt
to equity only reﬂects in a diﬀerent value of the entrepreneurs’ discount factor. Intuitively,
entrepreneurs in the euro area need a higher amount of costly external ﬁnance, x − n,t ob e
able to produce the same amount of output. This requires lower investment in the ﬁrm’s net
worth and thus entrepreneurs discounting the future at a higher rate.
The benchmark-DFU model for the US generates a higher overall variability relative to the
one for the euro area (as reﬂected by the sum of all variances). This is mainly due to higher
availability of public information (σε1).
When the model is calibrated to generate the stylized facts observed in the US and the euro
area, we obtain substantial diﬀerences in the parameter values. Three points are worth noticing.
First, the degree of ex-ante heterogeneity σε1, i.e. the availability of public information in the
ﬁnancial market, is larger in the US than in the euro area. Conversely, the volatility of the
signal ε2 is larger in the model of the euro area, providing an explanation for the more intensive
use of bank ﬁnance versus bond ﬁnance. The incentive to use banks is enhanced by the lower
cost of acquiring information, as reﬂected in the value of the calibrated up-front fee τ.A
more appropriate measure of the eﬃciency of banks in providing information should take into
account the precision of the signal ε2,a sm e a s u r e db y 1
σ2
ε2




, which equals .24 for the US and .10 for the euro area. The availability of private versus
public information in the ﬁnancial market and the relative costs of banking services seem a
major explanation of the diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure of the US and the euro area.
30Table 3. Properties of the calibrated model
Variable Model US Data US Model EA Data EA
Bank loans to corporate bonds .74 .75 7.1 7.3
Firm’s debt to equity .41 .41 .61 .61
Default rate on loans .043 .016-.050 .027 .016-.045
Default rate on bonds .095 .045-.062 .077 .045-.062
Risk premium on loans .016 .030 .036 .027
Risk premium on bonds .039 .034 .015 .034
Table 3 evaluates the performance of the model in terms of the key ﬁnancial facts outlined
above. The model closely matches two important features of the ﬁnancial structure in the US
and the euro area: the ﬁrm’s average debt to equity ratio and the ratio of bank ﬁnance to
bond ﬁnance. However, it fails to reproduce the higher spread on bank loans in the US relative
to the euro area. In particular, the model underestimates the risk premium on loans in the
US and the risk premium on bonds in the euro area. The model also produces reasonable
default rates on bank loans but overestimates default rates on corporate bonds. Nonetheless,
aggregate default rates for the corporate sector, reported in Table 4, are close to those observed
in the data.
Table 4: Facts in steady state
Variable US benchmark-DFU model US EA benchmark-DFU model EA
y .88 .93 .76 .67
c+e
y .86 .86 .89 .91
I
y .13 .12 .10 .07
ya
y .006 .018 .007 .011
average default rate .046 .061 .045 .031
average risk premium .034 .025 .034 .032
share abstain 0 0 0 0
share bank 0 .51 0 .88
share CMF 1 .49 1 .12
dropout if banking 0 .31 0 .07
Table 4 lists other properties of the calibrated models in steady state and compare them
to those arising in the benchmark-DFU model. The benchmark-CF model is not reported as
31it leads to values similar to those arising under the benchmark-DFU model. Notice that the
low calibrated value for γ in the model of the euro area implies that entrepreneurs heavily
discount the future. Therefore, they require large returns to physical capital to invest. This
explains why the model delivers a ratio of investment to GDP that is much lower in the euro
area relative to the US. Correspondingly, entrepreneurial consumption is larger, and so is the
ratio of total private consumption to GDP. The table also reports output lost to agency costs
as a share of GDP. This increases with the average default rate. The reason why output lost
to agency costs is higher in the models of the euro area relative to those of the US, despite
the lower average default rate, is that ﬁrms use a larger share of external ﬁnance. Finally,
the table reports the steady state distribution of ﬁrms. Interestingly, both in the calibrated
models of the US and of the euro area all ﬁrms decide to produce and to raise external ﬁnance.
The larger share of bank ﬁnance explains the ratio of bank loans to corporate bonds observed
in the data. Notice also the lower drop-out rate conditional on bank ﬁnance in the model of
the euro area. After having signed a contract with a bank and having observed the second
shock ε2, the remaining residual uncertainty from production is lower in the euro area. Hence,
a larger share of ﬁrms decides to undertake production.
Table 5: Financial structure and per-capita GDP










Bond vs bank ﬁnance
1.39
Diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures in the calibrated models of the US and the euro area
lead to diﬀerent values of per-capita GDP. In Table 5, we compare the model-based gaps in
per-capita GDP arising under alternative models to the gap observed in the data. This allows
us to provide a measure of the quantitative importance of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures.
The ratio of per-capita GDP in the US relative to the euro area is 1.62 in the data.15 The
15Output is average annual GDP per capita at market prices, for the period 2002-2003. Source: OECD
Economic Outlook.
32second row of the table indicates that the ratio is unitary in a model which does not account
for diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure. The third row reports a value of 1.16 for a model
where the only diﬀerence is in the debt to equity ratio (.41 for the US and .61 for the euro
area). The fourth row shows that adding ex-ante heterogeneity (σε1 being .13 for the US and
.09 for the euro area) without introducing alternative instruments of external ﬁnance does
not increase the explanatory power of the model. However, using the model presented in this
paper, the ratio increases to 1.39. A model that account for diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures
(abstracting from other factors, such as TFP) can explain 86 percent of the gap observed in
the data.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a DSGE model with agency costs, ﬁrms’ heterogeneity and multiple in-
struments of external ﬁnance. In this economy, the choice of entrepreneurs among alternative
ﬁnancing instruments determines the overall cost of information asymmetries and credit mar-
ket frictions. The calibrated model suggests that a larger share of bank ﬁnance in the euro
area is due to lower availability of public information about ﬁrms’ credit worthiness and to
higher eﬃciency of banks in acquiring this type of information. We also ﬁnd that diﬀerences
in the ﬁnancial structure aﬀect allocations, leading to discrepancies in aggregate consumption,
investment and per-capita GDP.
The model presented in this paper can be extended in various directions. One possibility,
which we plan to explore in future research, is to build a monetary extension of this model to
analyse whether diﬀerent ﬁnancial structures can account for diﬀerences in the transmission
of monetary policy observed in the US and the euro area. Information on ﬁnancial structures
is typically regarded as important by central banks. Movements in the policy rate inﬂuence
market interest rates, the price of ﬁnancial assets, and real activity through changes in the
ﬁnancial decisions of consumers and investors. Hence, features of the ﬁnancial system such as
the relative importance of bank loans versus other instruments of external ﬁnance may help to
explain diﬀerences in the transmission of monetary policy.
33Appendix
A. The stochastic steady state
We denote steady state variables by dropping the time subscript. The unique steady state can
be obtained as follows. First, compute r,q,w and c by solving the equations












To compute the overall expected proﬁts F(ε1q), we use the following procedure. First, under
our distributional assumptions on the productivity shocks ε1,ε 2 and ε3, we can use the following







f(ωj)=1− Φ(x − σ) − ωj [1 − Φ(x)]





where ϕ and Φ denote the standard normal, x ≡
logωj+0.5σ2
σ and j = b,c. Second, we need to
solve for the thresholds sd,s b and sc. We start by solving numerically the condition




to obtain the function ωj(s). The function ωb(s) for bank-ﬁnanced ﬁr m si sd e r i v e db yd e ﬁning
s = ε1ε2q and by using the variance σ2
ε3 of the log-normal distribution. The function ωc(s) for
CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁr m si sd e r i v e db yd e ﬁning s = ε1q and by using the variance σ2
ε2 + σ2
ε3.T h e
cutoﬀ value for proceeding with the bank loan is found by solving numerically the condition
sdf(ωb(sd))ξ =1 .






























34where s = ε1q. The payoﬀ for the CMF-ﬁnanced entrepreneur can be computed as
Fc(s)=sf(ωc(s))ξ
With this, it is possible to calculate the overall return F(s) to entrepreneurial investment, the































































Then, compute z as z = c
c
z
and use it to compute the aggregate variables n,x,K,l,k and c.
Finally, use the steady state version of equations (19) and (24) to compute y and e, and of the
resource constraint (27) to compute ya.
B. Cross-state subsidization
We consider a general class of contracts between banks and ﬁrms, which specify the threshold
level ω(sε2) and repayment c(sε2) that, given s = ε1q, maximize the ﬁrm’s expected return
across realizations of ε2, subject to four constraints: 1) the project size being a ﬁxed share
of the ﬁrm’s net worth; 2) the bank breaking even in expectations across states; 3) the sum
of all repayments across ﬁrms covering the information costs faced by the bank; and 4) the
repayment not exceeding the available initial net worth.


































(1 − c(sε2))(ζ − 1)Φ2(dε2)+τ
Z
c(sε2)Φ2(dε2) ≥ τ (31)
c(sε2) ≤ 1 for all ε2. (32)















































s , and by
Z sd
s
[−1+λ(s)+θ(s)]Φ2(dε2) − η(sε2) ≤ 0,
if ε2 <
sd
s . Here λ(s),θ(s) and η(sε2) are the Lagrangean multipliers on constraints (30), (31)
and (32) respectively.
The ﬁrst two constraints of the ﬁnancial intermediary are binding at the optimum. There-
fore, λ(s) and θ(s) must be strictly positive. Notice also that condition (33) implies that at














< 0 and g0 ¡
ωb¢
= −[f0 (ω)+µφ(ω)] > 0.
The optimal condition for c(sv) is given by (34), if ε2 ≥
sd








Since θ(s)+λ(s) − 1 ≥ 0, optimality requires that η(sε2)=η(s) > 0 or




Hence, the optimal contract is given by an up-front fee of 100% of the initial net worth,
if the ﬁrm does not produce, and by a threshold for the unobserved shock ωb (sε2) and an
up-front fee c(sε2) that satisfy (33) and (34), if the ﬁrm undertakes production.
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